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REPLY TO JOSHUA MELTZER
When interpreting or giving meaning to WTO treaty terms, what
other rules of international law can or must WTO panels take into account? As Mr. Meltzer points out, I have taken the view that those rules,
referred to in Art. 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention, must reflect the
common intentions of all WTO members. To my mind, it is not sufficient
for a rule to be binding only on the disputing parties (it must reflect the
common intentions of all WTO members), nor is it necessary that the
rule is legally binding on all WTO members (it suffices that the rule reflects their common intentions). In my book, I also elaborate on: (i) the
types or sources of rules that can be referred to (essentially any source,
be it general principles of law, custom, treaties or even decisions of international organizations); (ii) the requirement that the rules be
"relevant"; and (iii) the timing of those rules (distinguishing between
contemporaneous and evolutionary interpretation).' Yet, the question of
membership to the rules is, as Mr. Meltzer's comments demonstrate,
probably the most controversial one.
It is hard to imagine that any one would argue that a purely bilateral
treaty between, for example, the EC and the US could change the way
WTO panels ought to interpret the multilateral WTO treaty. It is a firmly
established principle that "the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the person or body who has the
power to modify or suppress it."'2 Or as the Appellate Body itself found:
"The purpose of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention is to ascertain the common intentions of the parties,' 3 not the
intentions of one or just a few parties to the WTO treaty. On that basis, I
am quite confident that a rule applicable only between the two parties
disputing a case before a WTO panel cannot influence the interpretation
of what a WTO term means.
At the same time, I am not convinced that Article 31.3(c) rules must
be legally binding on all WTO members, in the strict sense that these
rules must confer rights or obligations on all WTO members. I see three
reasons to come to this conclusion.
First, the process of treaty interpretation,at least the way I understand it, is a fairly limited one. A word or string of words in a WTO
provision-be it "exhaustible natural resources" in GATT Article XX,
1.
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(2003).
2.
Advisory Opinion on the Question of Jaworzina, PCU, Series B, No. 8 (1923).
3.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities--Computer Equipment, WTO
Doc. WT/DS62/AB/R, 84 (1998) (emphasis in the original).
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"foreign-source income" in footnote 59 to the Subsidies Agreement or
"development, financial and trade need" in the Enabling Clause-is not
entirely clear and must be given meaning. In the process of defining
those specific terms, must a panel limit itself to outside material that is
legally binding on all WTO members? I do not think so. Rather, it suffices that those outside sources reflect a definition or provide a meaning
that is commonly understood by all WTO members. After all, interpreting a WTO term with reference to other sources is not adding legally
binding rights or obligations to the WTO term, but a rather technical,
linguistic exercise of defining the very meaning of the WTO term. Indeed, the very first outside source that panels consistently refer to is
surely one that is not legally binding on all WTO members, namely the
Oxford English Dictionary where the Appellate Body looks for "ordinary
meaning." Equally so, in my view, the distinguishing factor for rules under Article 31.3(c) ought not be that they are legally binding on all WTO
members, but rather that they reflect a common understanding between
WTO members.
Second, although the terms in Article 31.3(c) are themselves ambiguous, they can support my broad interpretation: reference is made to
rules "applicable in the relations between the parties", not rules "legally
binding on all the parties."
Third, and not least important, the Appellate Body has, in its interpretation of WTO terms, already referred to rules that are not legally
binding on all WTO members. It even referred to rules not binding on
the disputing parties. In US-Shrimp, it stated that the terms "exhaustible
natural resources" in GATT Article XX must be read "in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection
and conservation of the environment" and referred to other treaties that
were not binding on all WTO members (not even on the disputing parties!) to come to the conclusion that "exhaustible natural resources"
includes both non-living and living resources. The same can be said
about the double taxation treaties and domestic taxation rules referred to
by the Appellate Body in US-FSC (Article 21.5-EC) when it was interpreting the term "foreign-source income" in footnote 59 of the Subsidies
agreement.5 Those treaties and domestic rules are, obviously, not binding
on all WTO Members. Nonetheless, the Appellate Body found that "certain widely recognized principles of taxation emerge from them" and

4.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, 129 (1998).
5.
Appellate Body Report, United States-FSC (Article 21.5-EC), WTO Doc.
WT/DS108/AB/RW, (H 141-145 (2002).
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that "it is appropriate ... to derive assistance" from these principles

when giving meaning to the WTO term "foreign-source income."6
As a result, I would not even accept Mr. Meltzer's requirement that
Article 31.1 (c) rules at a minimum, be legally binding on the parties to a
WTO dispute. The Appellate Body has, indeed, referred to rules that are
not binding on both disputing parties. For example, neither Thailand nor
the US are bound by UNCLOS or the Convention on Biological Diversity and yet the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp referred to them. In my
view, the Appellate Body can do so as long as the meaning imparted
from those rules can still be said to reflect a common understanding of
all WTO members.
One further caveat: having said that rules binding only between the
disputing parties (and not reflecting the common intentions of all WTO
members) cannot be referred to when interpreting the WTO treaty, does
not mean that they have no role to play before a WTO panel. To the contrary, I have argued that such rules can even play a more important role,
namely that they can be invoked by the defendant as part of the applicable law to a WTO dispute on the basis of which a WTO panel may have
to decline jurisdiction or find that a WTO provision no longer applies
and is, therefore, not violated. Other commentators (such as Petros
Mavroidis and Gabrielle Marceau) would achieve the same result but do
so within the process of treaty interpretation, arguing that also rules
binding only between the disputing parties are relevant under Article
31.3(c). In my view, however, what one is then doing is no longer interpreting a treaty with reference to other law, but applying other law to see
whether a WTO rule can still be said to be violated. In other words, the
fact that I take a rather broad view on Article 31.3(c) rules-in that they
do not need to be legally binding on all WTO members-is not because
otherwise one severely limits the extent to which the WTO is able to reflect and respond to the larger body of public international law. In my
view, even if Article 31.3(c) would limit the process of interpretationto
rules legally binding on all WTO members (quod non), a bilateral treaty
binding only between the disputing parties could still be part of the applicable law before a WTO panel and excuse a potential WTO violation.
Finally, Mr. Meltzer's warning about the "formal legitimacy" of
rules that the Appellate Body can refer to when interpreting WTO terms
must be taken seriously. Article 31.3(c) should, in the first place, be used
to refer to rules explicitly agreed to by all WTO members, especially
well-established general principles of law, custom and other treaties or
decisions. Opening the door to rules not legally binding on all WTO
6.
7.

Id. 142.
See supra note 1, at 456-472.
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members, not even on the disputing parties, may be permissible, but it
remains a risky step: When and how will the Appellate Body decide that
something rises to the level of a "contemporary concern of the community of nations", "a widely recognized principle" or a "broad-based
recognition of a particular need"? Any such conclusion should not be
reached lightly and must be convincingly explained. The best safeguard
against abuse is, however, that the reference must be to something that is
part of the common understanding of all WTO members (much like the
Oxford English Dictionary!). So far, in none of the cases discussed, did a
single WTO member complain that this was not the case. Let us hope
that the Appellate Body will be careful enough to keep it this way.
JOOST PAUWELYN

